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Abstract 
It is no exaggeration to say that sovereignty is the foundation both of International Relations (IR) 
as a field of enquiry and of international politics as an “actual existing” field of practice. 
Whether seen as the archetypal IR101 topic or in debates about the rights and wrongs of 
humanitarian intervention, the capacity of international organisations to exert control over 
significant spheres of international politics, or in discussions about the legitimacy of bodies such 
as the International Criminal Court (ICC), sovereignty appears as the central referent point of 
international politics. Over recent years, however, there has been considerable debate over both 
the substantive content (“fact”) and normative framing (“value”) of sovereignty. The former 
comes about as a result of a series of political, economic and security challenges which see states 
as assuming a role as “one-amongst-many” in an increasingly complex international topography; 
the latter stems from concerns about whether national states form the optimal site for the 
articulation of authority claims. This forum engages with both of these debates, focusing on how 
they relate to understandings of the emergence, development and possible emasculation of 
sovereignty in the contemporary world. In the introduction to the forum, we outline the ways in 
which scholars have contested the emergence of the sovereign state and examine the ethical 
issues surrounding the normative value of this form of rule. In the process, we lay out the ways 
in which the papers which make up this forum make uncomfortable, if important, contributions 
to the debate about the fact and value – or “is” and “ought” – of sovereignty in contemporary 
world politics.  
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Beyond hypocrisy?  
It is no exaggeration to say that sovereignty is the foundation both of International Relations (IR) 
as a field of enquiry and of international politics as an “actual existing” field of practice. For the 
former, sovereignty is the archetypal IR101 topic. Students entering the subject are informed that 
sovereignty emerged in Europe sometime around the mid seventeenth century before being 
exported to the rest of the world, often by force of arms, over the next few centuries. There may 
be disagreement over sovereignty’s precise point of origin (cf. Ruggie, 1983; Rosenberg, 1994; 
Spruyt, 1994; Krasner, 1999; Reus-Smit, 1999; Philpott, 2001; Osiander, 2001; Teschke, 2003), 
but the basic narrative remains intact: for IR – sovereignty is synonymous with the emergence of 
the modern state system and, as such, forms the generative grammar of IR as a distinct subject 
matter. For the latter, sovereignty is equally important. Only rarely do policy makers make a 
speech about international affairs without reference to sovereignty: it is at the heart of debates 
about intervention – potential or actual – in Iraq, Afghanistan, Darfur and Zimbabwe; it speaks to 
the capacity of the European Union (EU), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), NATO and 
other international organisations to exert control over significant spheres of international politics; 
and it undergirds discussions about the legitimacy of bodies such as the International Criminal 
Court (ICC), the status of “prisoners of war” in the “global war on terror” and the juridical space 
occupied by US military tribunals or practices of “extraordinary rendition”. Even when states 
explicitly intervene in other territories – whether through the brute fact of invasion or by subtler 
means of diplomacy and trade – they often do so by reference to why sovereignty can be 
suspended in special cases. As such, even when the norm of sovereignty is broken, it still appears 
as the central referent point of international politics. In short, sovereignty is a conceptual marker, 
normative frame and political tool without rival. It is IR’s font and altar.  
 
Given the centrality of sovereignty to IR, it is no surprise to find numerous debates circulating 
around it: its place as ground-rule (Bull, 1984) or gibberish (James, 1984); its spread as a 
fundamental institution of international society (Watson, 1992; Buzan, 2004; Buzan and Little, 
2010) or as a coercive standard of civilisation (Gong, 1984; Keene, 2002; Suzuki, 2009); and its 
emergence (Ruggie, 1983) and possible supersession in the contemporary world (Linklater, 
1998; Habermas, 2001; Held, 2004). Over recent years, sovereignty has, once more, been at the 
centre of disciplinary debates. The emergence of practices like humanitarian intervention, the 
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extension of a human rights regime around the world, the growing voices of transnational 
indigenous movements in international organisations, the increasing interdependence of 
economies, and the rise of US hyperpower speak to a complex topography which has outgrown 
shorthands of formal equality and non-intervention. But even as sovereignty is seen to be on the 
retreat, there are pertinent reminders – not least amongst them the war in Iraq and the economic 
crisis instituted by the 2007 credit crunch – which speak to the continuing hold of sovereignty on 
international affairs. At the very least, sovereignty appears as a defensive wall against externally 
generated instabilities. And even as migration, travel, economic interdependence and 
technological exchanges serve to weaken national borders, so virulent strains of nationalism, 
locally rooted identities, and the renationalisation of state security and economic powers act to 
harden them.  
 
Alongside contestation over the substantive content of sovereignty can be found corresponding 
questions regarding the continuing hold of sovereignty as a normative frame. Frequently, 
cosmopolitan theorists see sovereignty as a barrier to the emergence of a progressive form of 
politics in which national boundaries place no (or at least relatively few) restrictions on notions 
of political community (Held, 1995; Habermas, 2001; Fraser and Honneth, 2003; Fraser, 2008). 
Nor, these scholars argue, should national borders – whether real or imagined – act as barriers to 
policies geared at reducing poverty (Pogge, 2008), raising levels of development (Collier, 2007) 
or generating co-operative security communities (Beck, 2006). In this way, the increasing 
“thickness” of the international sphere as witnessed by the burgeoning remit of units of global 
governance, the extension of international law and the emergence of apparently robust 
international regimes stand as hallmarks of a cosmopolitan era which can eliminate “backward” 
ideas like sovereignty. However, just as there is fundamental disagreement over the substantive 
content of sovereignty in the contemporary world, so too are there sharp disagreements over the 
normative implications of a decline in sovereignty. Indeed, critics argue that imagining a world 
without borders may induce a concomitant decline in notions of solidarity and community, 
engendering a hollowing out of politics which is as counterproductive as it is naïve (Chandler, 
2009). Equally importantly, claims about the need for emancipatory politics to bury ideas of 
sovereignty sit uneasily with those states, many of whom have experienced centuries of 
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imperialism, colonisation and other forms of exploitation, which see claims of national 
sovereignty as powerful bulwarks against foreign aggression (Lawson, 2008).  
 
The place of sovereignty in contemporary world politics, therefore, can be seen as doubly 
contested: first, in terms of its salience as a substantive area of international politics; and second, 
in terms of its role as a normative frame of reference. Indeed, some of the core debates in the 
discipline concern critiques over how sovereignty has been understood theoretically and 
historically on the one hand, and over the ethical promise of the good life provided by – or 
subverted by – sovereign forms of rule on the other. Needless to say, few classical texts on 
sovereignty divorced the moral significance of the condition from its theorization. This forum 
engages formatively with these debates – ten years after Stephen Krasner’s (1999) landmark 
investigation of sovereignty as “organised hypocrisy”, it is time to revisit the hold of sovereignty 
on the international imagination. In order to situate the contributions within the vast literature on 
the subject, we first sketch the ways in which scholars have contested the emergence and 
facticity of the sovereign state, before moving on to examine the ethical issues surrounding the 
normative value of this form of statehood. The final section illustrates the specific ways in which 
the other articles in the forum contribute to our understanding of the “fact” and “value” – or “is” 
and “ought” – of sovereignty.  
 
The fact of sovereignty? 
If students of International Relations question the hold of sovereignty over the subject, they 
usually do so by reference to when sovereignty appeared: in the cuius region, eius religio (whose 
the region, his the religion) clauses instituted at the Treaties of Augsburg (1555) and Westphalia 
(1648) (Wight, 1992); in the inter-state wars and geopolitical struggles ushered in by the 
European military revolution of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (Gilpin, 1981; Mann, 
1988; Tilly, 1992); in normative shifts associated with shifting understandings of territoriality 
(Ruggie, 1983), religious belief (Philpott, 2001; Nexon, 2009) and statehood (Reus-Smit, 1999); 
via fundamental shake-ups to the constitution of modern subjectivity (Walker, 1993; Weber, 
1995; Bartelson, 1995); or in the development of private property rights and other processes 
associated with the emergence of industrial capitalism (Rosenberg, 1994; Teschke, 2003). When 
conducting these debates, IR scholars are effectively carbon-dating the discipline’s “big bang”. 
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For sovereignty is considered to be IR’s moment of intellectual conception, marking the advent 
of an order which, it is argued, first placed meaningful constraints on interference in the 
“internal” affairs of states. As such, sovereignty is to IR what modernity is to other social 
sciences – its leitmotif. 
 
The attempt to date sovereignty is, therefore, an important one. Indeed, the shorthand of 
“Westphalia” to describe both modern and “normal” inter-state relations is one employed by 
both academics and policy makers alike. Likewise, the degree to which we understand the 
current political order as post-Westphalian relies on a prior assumption about how Westphalian 
the order was in the first place. And Westphalia is certainly important in as much as it is a 
representation of a political imaginary which posits the formal, reciprocal recognition by nation-
states of the political sovereignty of other like-units, in other words the process by which 
composite polities became caged within a territorially limited, relatively autonomous, centrally 
demarcated political unit – the nation-state. At the very least, so the argument goes, Westphalia 
provides a hegemonic story for how political imaginaries have developed over the last few 
centuries, with “post-Westphalia” acting as the leading edge of emancipatory possibilities within 
the contemporary era.  
 
However, there are a number of problems with this standard script, not least the consideration 
that formal sovereignty – the generative grammar of the Westphalian states-system – has been 
consistently subject to convention, contract, coercion and imposition (Krasner, 1999). It is clear 
from the historical record that Westphalia has usually been a luxury restricted to the great powers 
– certainly those in the colonies who appealed for the right to national self-determination based 
on the recognition of formal sovereignty tended to find their petitions falling on deaf ears. It was 
only after the Hague Conference of 1899 that attendance at international conferences included 
non-Europeans, and it was only at the second Hague Conference of 1907 that Europeans were 
outnumbered by non-Europeans. At the Paris Peace talks of 1919, Robert Lansing (in Chandler, 
2003: 29), the US Secretary of State, commented critically on President Wilson’s avocation of 
the principle of self-determination, 
 
The more I think about the President’s declaration of the right of self-determination, the 
more convinced I am of the danger of putting such ideas into the minds of certain races. It 
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is bound to be the basis of impossible demands and to create trouble in many lands. What 
effect will it have on the Irish, the Indians, the Egyptians, and the nationalists among the 
Boers? Will not the Mohammedans of Syria and Palestine and possibly Morocco and 
Tripoli rely on it? 
 
Wilson himself saw self-determination as extendable only to Central Europe and pressured 
delegates in the League of Nations to reject Japan’s request to include a clause on racial equality 
in its charter (Lauren, 1996; Ambrosius, 2007). The Bolshevik Declaration of the Rights of the 
Toiling and Exploited People, published in January 1918, may have extended principles of rights 
to the non-West but it was only after the birth of the United Nations that the principle of 
sovereign equality became more widely recognised. In this sense, sovereignty – both in terms of 
legitimate authority and in terms of power capabilities – was a partial game during the modern 
period, a principle which has been recognised, both in de jure and de facto terms, only relatively 
recently (Chandler, 2003). 
 
One might even say that until relatively recently, the broader dynamic instituted by the formation 
and break-up of empires was much more important to the development of the modern world than 
the integrity of Westphalian sovereignty. Indeed, world politics in the modern era has largely 
been oriented around a complex system of hierarchy – differentiated by time and place – in 
which various metropoles have subordinated their congeries (Hobson and Sharman, 2005). 
Within this system, authority has been parcelled out in a procession of authority relations, or as 
Jack Donnelly (2006) prefers, as variations of “hierarchy in anarchy”. Throughout the early 
modern period, various “confetti empires” (Teschke, 2006), curious public-private hybrids, 
competed in the formation of hierarchical multi-states systems around the world, practising 
diverse strategies of spatialisastion and territorialisation which brought much of the world within 
their compass. The subsequent formalisation of land and sea empires, and their break-up during 
the twentieth century produced post-imperial orders, at least in some parts of the world, which 
ironically enough, required the sanctioning authority of imperial powers – what Niall Ferguson 
(2005) calls the “imperialism of anti-imperialism”. In this way, Britain repackaged its former 
colonies as “overseas territories”, granted citizenship rights to its residents, acknowledged the 
right to self-determination, and supported programmes of modernisation, both political and 
economic, as long as the overarching relationship between the former colonial master and newly 
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“independent” states remained one of dependence. It was only after the end of the Second World 
War that empires became widely delegitimised as a form of political authority and imagination, 
and even then, the post-colonial breaking of European empires required sponsorship by a 
superpower. The Soviet Union ran an informal empire throughout the Cold War in which claims 
for national sovereignty were regularly engulfed within broader claims of political authority, by 
force if necessary (Wendt and Friedheim, 1995). France, Portugal and other European states 
maintained formal empires until the 1970s, and continue to retain dependencies today.  
 
Even during the post-Cold War era can be found debates over the continuing hold of empire as a 
form of rule, both as regards the scale and scope of US power (Ikenberry, 2002; Mann, 2003; 
Ignatieff, 2003; Cox, 2004), and the extent to which polities such as China, India and Russia 
should be understood as nation-states or as (post) imperial spaces. Moreover, the rise of 
“international administrations” that govern post-conflict zones, such as in the former Yugoslavia 
and East Timor, can best be seen as a redux version of the mandate system of the League of 
Nations (Bain, 2003). The mandate system was perhaps the first occasion where international 
institutions had full access to the interior of societies (Anghie, 2002). Under this system, the 
populations in the remnants of the German and Ottoman empires were governed according to 
where they fell on a racialized line of progress from savagery to civilization. And although the 
current version of mandate-rule does not directly justify administration according to racialized 
typographies, nevertheless the new articulation holds assumptions that echo John Stuart Mill’s 
arguments over intervention and colonization (Jahn, 2006), not least that the “good” life cannot 
be cultivated amongst those who do not display the laws and mores adequate for the task. In 
these cases, so the argument goes, the “correct” form of order and rule must be delivered by 
external agents. And such considerations can also be said to apply to the field of peacekeeping 
(Paris, 2002), where actions have sometimes been justified, at least by European voices, as 
positively imperialist in character (e.g. Cooper, 2002; see also Biccum, 2005).  
 
In sum, therefore, the modern era has seen the development of multiple states-systems which live 
off the presence of imperial guarantors. As such, the international realm, both during the modern 
era and further back in history (Kaufman et al eds., 2007), can better be characterised in terms of 
imperial or hegemonic hierarchy rather than by sovereign equality (Watson, 1992; Cooley, 
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2005). Indeed, the principal question in IR now appears to be less geared at establishing the 
importance of hierarchy to world historical development than in exploring the various logics 
under which different forms of hierarchy operate (Nexon and Wright, 2007). The key point is 
that the broader age of hierarchy/empire subsumes the Westphalian moment within its canvass, 
leading us to see the logic of reciprocal sovereignty bounded or caged within the nation state as 
both recent and limited. As such, if we are to speak of a Westphalian political imaginary, we 
should recognise that it has reached its zenith rather than its nadir in the post-Cold War world, a 
period in which state sovereignty – both as aspiration and practice – has become much more 
extensively available than in previous epochs. For those who fought so long for freedom from 
the yoke of European empire, particularly in the Third World, Westphalian state sovereignty has 
often served as both a source of emancipation and as a first line of defence against fundamental 
sources of inequality, whether these are historical, economic or geopolitical in origin. As a result, 
attempts at building broader dialogic and institutional forums beyond the nation-state will 
continue to run up against some all-too-real obstacles. Witness, for example, the centrality of 
notions of sovereign authority to the debates about trade, development, aid and security that 
constitute the quotidian stuff of politics within the UN system, or somewhat more gruesomely, to 
the ongoing conflict in Iraq. 
 
The value of sovereignty? 
Running simultaneously to these debates over the substantive content of sovereignty can be 
found contestation over the very desirability of modern sovereignty as the telos of human 
development. In fact, in modern history, issues of political representation, economic 
redistribution and cultural recognition were not always delineated cleanly within bounded 
sovereign states, but often went across and between them via processes of revolution and 
counter-revolution (Halliday, 1999; Lawson, 2005). Broader notions of political community 
flourished and multiplied, such as the Islamic umma (Roy, 2006), pan-racial movements 
(Shilliam, 2006), various regional and pan-regional formations (such as the Bandung “moment”) 
(Berger, 2004), anti-colonial internationalism including the Tricontinental movement (Young, 
2001), transnational diasporic communities (Clifford, 1994), international women’s movements 
(Rupp, 1997), indigenous groupings (Morgan, 2007), and, of course, liberal cosmopolitanism 
itself (Held, 2004). In this sense, even if we do accept the Westphalian order as predominant 
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after 1945, we must also accept that there were rival forms of political legitimacy and justice 
during this period, for example the emergence of global civil society as invested in the human 
rights regime (Nash, 2009). It is illustrative to note that the formation of the UN institutionalises 
these contradictions, recognising as it does both formal Westphalian sovereignty as vested in 
member states, and the universal sanctity of human rights (Brown, 2006).   
 
Despite the historical existence of this plethora of projects, many believe that with the 
development of the European Union we stand at the threshold of an extra-territorial and multi-
level universe of political communities, in which nation-states, regional organisations and 
international organisations overlap (Held, 2002). This debate has prompted extended exchanges 
about the nature of the supposed transformation in European sovereignty, in particular over 
whether this new era holds the potential for an emancipatory transformation in the rights and 
duties of the political subject away from the strictures of territorial exclusivity. For many 
researchers, the European Union stands as an exemplar of the politics of the possible (e.g. 
Archibugi, 2008) with subsequent debate focusing on the broader salience of Jürgen Habermas’ 
thesis of a “postnational constellation” (Habermas, 2001; Borowiak, 2008; Kumar, 2008; Wilde, 
2007). Indeed, critical theorists rooted in the Frankfurt tradition, if often unsympathetic to the 
current shape of the EU, tend to see it as containing the potential for dismantling the political 
straightjacket that fractures the global dialogic community (Beck, 2006; Honneth, 2009). 
 
The Global War on Terror has further raised the stakes of this debate. Since 9/11, talk has been 
rife of the decline of the West (Anderson et al, 2008) and the break up of the Transatlantic 
Community itself (Cox, 2005). The Transatlantic Community – as the quintessential example of 
a robust “security community” – is often considered to be the protector and cultivator of Western 
civilization. Indeed, NATO has long held the promise, at least for some, of reaping the dividends 
of a “democratic peace” in international affairs (Deutsch et al, 1957). In turn, the nerve centre of 
the community has often been understood to reside in the “special relationship” between Britain 
and the US (Danchev, 1996), with NATO and the OEEC (now OECD) constituting its military 
and economic sinews. However, the bridge between the United States and Europe seems to have 
weakened (perhaps to the point of collapse) because it cannot bear the weight of two (apparently) 
different forms of foreign policy – the Hobbesian and the Kantian (Kagan, 2002) – which are 
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rooted in divergent power capabilities and, increasingly, distinct world views. For some 
luminaries (e.g. Habermas and Derrida, 2006), the distinctiveness of a European public sphere 
offers hope for a form of world citizenship that can be extended outwards to subsume within it 
the unilateralism and belligerency of the United States (see also Fraser, 2005). Indeed, the 
progressive, cosmopolitan values of the European public sphere could inform the composition of 
an EU foreign policy that exercises a transformative “normative power” eschewing the poles of a 
realist proto-superpower and an idealist “EUtopia” in order to promote the conditions necessary 
for the emergence of world citizenship (Rosecrance, 1998; Manners, 2008; Dunne, 2008). And 
such views are not merely academic, but evident amongst the wider European foreign policy 
intelligentsia (e.g. Solana, 2005; Leonard, 2005). On the other hand, a sense of a “democratic 
deficit” has developed over the organisation and functioning of the EU, in particular its elitism, 
one manifested in recent votes against a European Constitution combined with a general lethargy 
towards the institutions of the EU themselves (Follesdal and Hix, 2005). There are also 
increasing concerns over the EU’s own flirtations with hyper-power and, indeed, with the notion 
of empire (Münkler, 2007), albeit only in the sense of what the President of the Commission, 
José Manuel Barroso, calls a specifically “non-imperial” empire (Waterfield, 2007).  
 
These trends should be seen within a broader sense of disillusionment with – and detachment 
from – the international institutions of global governance (Held and Koenig-Archibugi, 2003). 
Indeed, these trends are only intelligible if one remembers that the abiding normative meaning of 
modern sovereignty was popular in intent, centring upon the right of peoples to self-
determination. Taking this line of reasoning to its logical conclusion, one might say that the 
rising tide of antipathy in much commentary – liberal and otherwise – towards the notion of a 
final authority in political life is an abrogation of collective responsibility, and with that, of 
political agency itself (Bickerton, Cunliffe and Gourevitch eds., 2007). In other words, the 
transfer of political will from the sovereign state to an amorphous “international community” 
does not solve abuses of power by the state, but rather dissolves political accountability. In this 
sense, the sovereign state is emerging as just one normative frame within an increasingly 
fractured international political space, one whose normative “value” is reducing and, in turn, 
inducing a concomitant watering down of notions of political engagement, popular mobilisation 
and collective action. 
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The forum 
Taken together, the four contributions to this forum offer important insights into one of the most 
important issues in international politics – the formation, development and, potentially, the 
emasculation of sovereignty both as substantive arena and as normative frame. The articles are 
intended to be read alongside, but also constructively against, each other. The first two essays 
take up the problem of the substance of modern European sovereignty by exploring how 
historical sociological accounts of the relationship between state and empire problematise, or at 
least re-contextualise, claims regarding the putative radical transformation of sovereignty as a 
form of rule. The second set of articles highlights both the practical and normative ambiguities 
regarding the contemporary direction of post-Westphalian governance, raising questions about 
the ethical appeal of alternative forms of rule to the sovereign state. At the heart of all four pieces 
lie major points of contestation regarding the history, theory, integrity and normative 
significance of sovereignty: the connections between imperialism and, indeed, globalisation to 
debates about sovereignty; the degree to which the shift away from national frames of political 
community towards international and supranational bodies induces a sense of public anomie; and 
the relationship between public and private, political and economic, material and ideational in 
the origins, development and (possibly terminal) decline of sovereignty.  
 
In the first article for the forum, John Hobson examines the extent to which sovereignty emerged 
within a European crucible, arguing that the origins of the modern states system are rooted less 
in pristine, endogenous, Western developments than in multiple interactions between peoples 
over the global longue-durée: traders, policy makers, militaries, scholars and so on. This 
exchange of ideas and practices (“resource portfolios”) engendered a complex international 
sphere upon which Western intellectuals and policy makers later inscribed a “civilisational line 
of apartheid” which divided the world into West and East, light and dark, civilised and barbarian. 
For Hobson, sovereignty acted as the lodestone for this binary – where Western powers reserved 
sovereignty (indeed hyper-sovereignty) for themselves, they imposed limited, conditional 
sovereignty on the “rude and unruly” peoples of the East. And these practices, Hobson contends, 
endure in contemporary notions of human rights, humanitarian intervention and the like. In the 
second contribution to the forum, Andrew Baker extends Hobson’s argument by exploring the 
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ways in which British identity during the twentieth century was bifurcated between notions of 
empire and national sovereignty. Intriguingly, Baker argues, empire acted to constrain British 
autonomy as rival centres of power – particularly in the white dominion countries – exerted 
considerable leverage over British policy, including appeasement. Equally intriguingly, Baker 
contends, state power in Britain only became centralised after World War Two as British shed its 
imperial commitments and became enmeshed in various multilateral (principally European and 
Atlanticist) political networks. Indeed, far from being the exemplar of a rational, bureaucratic 
modern state, contemporary Britain is a “post-colonial” invention born from its pre-World War 
Two imperial experiences.  
 
Both Hobson and Baker raise fundamental questions about the origins of sovereignty and, in 
particular, when and where sovereignty can be said to have emerged. The two remaining articles 
in the forum – by James Heartfield and Chris Bickerton – continue these themes. Heartfield 
explores the decline in national sovereignty in Western Europe since World War Two, 
particularly vis-à-vis the emergence of the European Union as a legitimate site of political 
authority. Rather than encroaching on formal de jure sovereignty, Heartfield sees the European 
project as filling a vacuum generated by the retreat of national institutions from public life in the 
face of declining levels of trust, lower levels of public participation in formal politics, and 
reduced levels of contact between elites and mass publics. In the final paper for the forum, Chris 
Bickerton complements Heartfield’s analysis by examining changes to notions of sovereignty in 
post-communist states since the end of the Cold War. Bickerton demonstrates the ways in which 
EU enlargement and other pressures to “internationalise” have reduced the legitimacy of national 
political actors. As a result, a gap has emerged between ruling elites, formal political institutions 
and publics, one with alarming consequences for the future of participatory democracy and 
active citizenship in Eastern and East-Central Europe. Bickerton’s piece, like the others in the 
forum, exposes some uncomfortable truths regarding one of the core issue facing scholars, 
students and practitioners of international politics in the contemporary world – the question of 
whether sovereignty continues to serve as the primary articulation of political rule and, if not, 
what alternatives there are to its hold as both substantive arena and as normative barometer. The 
contributions promise no ultimate resolution to these thorny questions, but they do shed light on 
one of IR’s most enduring concerns. 
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